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# THE JOURNAL OF THE WEST VIRGINIA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

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## MOUNTAINEER GREEN BERETS: SPECIAL FORCES UNITS IN THE WEST VIRGINIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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West Virginia Guardsmen wearing the green beret share a unique military tradition with their comrades in the Regular Army and Army Reserve. A full history of Special Forces is beyond the scope of this paper, but a summary is necessary in order to illustrate the broader context of state participation.

### Army Special Forces

Special Forces has a special mission: unconventional warfare. The mission includes development of guerrilla units in territory "denied" by enemy forces, installing counterinsurgency programs to resist hostile insurgency movements, training and developing counter guerrilla military units, conducting civic action programs to help alleviate the socio-economic conditions which foster insurgency, escape and evasion support, and performing "direct action" tactical operations. This wide array of functions has accumulated over several years, and various functions have held pre-eminence at different points in Special Forces' thirty years of existence.

The roots of today's Special Forces are found in World War II. In countries occupied by Axis forces, resistance movements sprang up more or less spontaneously. The Allies sought to harness and direct the espionage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare and propaganda potential inherent in these movements. Great Britain was first in the field, infiltrating agents of its Special Operations Executive (SOE) to provide training, influence native guerrilla commanders and arrange for externally delivered supplies essential for combat operations. SOE was later joined by the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a civilian agency reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Because the agency was independent of service control, and many military leaders were skeptical of the value of unconventional warfare, OSS chief William J. Donovan frequently had to rely on President Roosevelt's personal intervention to secure needed cooperation and assistance from the service chiefs.<sup>1</sup>

Like SOE, OSS had several unconventional warfare missions, but only guerrilla warfare sponsorship need concern us here. The agency's Operational Group Command, created in May 1943, worked with SOE to organize, assist and exploit resistance in many occupied countries. Unlike the British, OSS concentrated the majority of its resources in France to coordinate internal resistance support for the invasion of the Continent. As the date of the invasion approached, OSS, SOE and the British Special Air Service (SAS) were combined under Special Forces Headquarters in March 1944. This headquarters reported directly to SHAEF.<sup>2</sup>

The OSS operational groups comprised four officers and 30 enlisted men, language qualified and highly trained in the art of building and leading sizeable guerrilla units. Groups were subdivided into sections of two officers and 13 enlisted men, which were parachuted into France after D-Day to raise and sustain guerrilla units, conduct raids and ambushes and gather intelligence. The intervention of operational groups, other OSS units such as the "Jedburgh" teams, and other elements of Special Forces Headquarters put the German war machine "to a severe test...nowhere was it secure from action by the Resistance."<sup>3</sup>

Roosevelt's death in April 1945 sealed the fate of OSS. President Truman ordered the agency disbanded on October 1, 1945, which resulted in the disappearance of "any type of United States capability for guerrilla warfare..."<sup>4</sup> The rapid onset of the Cold War generated new interest in unconventional capabilities. Responsibility was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in June 1948, and many former OSS agents with guerrilla warfare experience were attracted to the CIA. Thus, unconventional warfare continued as the domain of a civilian agency following World War II.<sup>5</sup>

There had been continued mild interest in unconventional warfare within the U.S. Army since 1946. Most of the studies and proposals confused the concepts of strategic unconventional operations with the tactical, raiding-type operations of units such as Rangers and Commandos. This confusion was compounded by jurisdictional jealousy between CIA and Army special warfare enthusiasts, and the long period of budget and manpower reductions imposed on the Army after the war. The latter reflected the Cold War strategy of "massive retaliation," which held that land forces were of little value in a nuclear war.<sup>6</sup>

The key factors in solidifying Army doctrine were the perceived benefit of sponsoring guerrilla movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, should the Soviets invade Western Europe, and the limited effectiveness of guerrilla sponsorship during the Korean War. Although the Army built up a division-equivalent United Nations Partisan Force, its operations overlapped with those launched independently by the CIA. Further, the operations tended to focus on tactical operations (especially raiding) and intelligence gathering, rather than development of a guerrilla infrastructure. Attempts to coordinate Army-CIA operations also proved largely ineffective.<sup>7</sup>

The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), under Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, launched a concerted campaign to establish an unconventional warfare capability in 1951. A staff of officers with unconventional warfare experience was created, including OSS veterans, men who had led guerrilla units in the Philippines and those who had served with Merrill's Marauders in Burma. These officers developed plans, organizations, operational concepts and training programs largely reflecting their own, predominantly OSS, experiences. Even though a "hot war" was under way in Korea, their focus was clearly on Europe. A primary thrust was enlistment of Eastern European aliens, coming to America under provisions of the Lodge Bill, to work with an "estimated 370,000 man potential within the USSR and its satellites." A concurrent effort was made to

clearly distinguish between tactical (Ranger) and OSS-type strategic missions. OCPW planners continued to encounter apathy among the Army high command, and jurisdictional jealousy from the CIA and the Air Force, which perceived itself as the military service most logically suited for unconventional warfare operations. Nevertheless, OCPW was able to take advantage of an August 1951 order for deactivation of all Ranger units in the Army to obtain the manpower spaces necessary to activate the first Special Forces unit.<sup>8</sup>

The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFGA) was constituted May 19, 1952, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as part of the new Psychological Warfare Center (later John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance - JFKCMA). Formal activation came from June 11.<sup>9</sup> At its inception, Special Forces was almost exclusively tailored for sponsoring guerrilla warfare: scant attention was paid to counterinsurgency, which only emerged as a major mission in the early 1960's. Further, Special Forces is indebted to a sister component of special warfare (psychological operations) for its existence, which underscores the typically tenuous position held by Special Forces.<sup>10</sup>

Special Forces expanded slowly. A second unit--77th SFGA--was activated in September 1953, also at Fort Bragg. No further increase came until 1st SFGA was activated on Okinawa nearly four years later (June 1957). Continued emphasis on European intervention is evident in this early structure: the Asia-oriented group was the last formed. This is particularly significant since some 70 Special Forces soldiers actually served in Korea during 1953. However, these men were dispatched as individuals rather than as a unit, and their unique training was not utilized.<sup>11</sup> It is also interesting to note that Special Forces units were not deployed to Eastern Europe to foster guerrilla resistance during the Polish, East German and Hungarian uprisings of the 1950's. These opportunities were more apparent than real. The Soviet Union massed overwhelming military power to crush the rebellions, and for the United States to have intervened "would almost surely have triggered off world war III."<sup>12</sup> This underscores the reality that intervention in Eastern Europe prior to the outbreak of a general NATO-Warsaw Pact war was and is infeasible.

A major reorganization came to Special Forces in April 1960, when 1st Special Forces was established as a "parent regiment" for all Special Forces units under the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS). CARS was adopted as a means of preserving the lineage and honors of historic Army units in the face of past and planned reorganizations which played havoc with regimental continuity. Under CARS, the regiment was virtually eliminated as a tactical unit and became "institutional" instead. "Parent regiments," existing only on paper, were selected from among the Army's more distinguished regiments, and less historic regiments inactivated. Tactical units such as battalions, groups, companies and batteries were then assigned to a "parent" in the same combat arm (infantry, artillery, armor or cavalry) to perpetuate the regiment's lineage, decorations and traditions.<sup>13</sup>

As might be expected, lineage experts faced a problem in selecting a "parent" for Special Forces, since there had never been an Army unit with a guerrilla warfare sponsorship mission. Indeed, Donovan was the "'spiritual father' of Army unconventional warfare," and the OSS operational groups were clearly the historical ancestors of Special Forces. Just as clearly, a civilian agency would not provide a suitable "parent" within the CARS concept. The problem was solved by adopting the "next best alternative." Two World War II era "special operations" type units were selected: 1st Special Service Force and 1st-6th Ranger Infantry Battalions. Special Forces insignia are traceable to the devices used by 1st Special Service Force: the crossed-arrows branch insignia is perpetuated in Special Forces distinctive insignia; the general shape of shoulder sleeve insignia is the same; and the shield in both units' coats of arms are identical. Fittingly, Maj. Gen. Robert T. Frederick, who commanded the Force through most of its existence, presented the Force colors to the commander of 7th SFGA in a 1960 ceremony at Fort Bragg.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, on April 15, 1960, 1st Special Service Force (less Service Battalion) and the Ranger battalions were officially consolidated and redesignated 1st Special Forces, providing for a total of 24 Special Forces groups under CARS. (At this time 77th SFGA was redesignated 7th SFGA.) Of this total, all but six were eventually activated. A unique feature of 1st Special Forces as a "parent" was the provision that all Special Forces groups, regardless of Army component, were embraced. This varied from standard CARS practice, which permitted Regular Army and Army Reserve units to share "parents," but established National Guard "parents" separately, based on traditional geographic association.<sup>15</sup>

Shortly after CARS was implemented, Special Forces entered a spectacular, albeit shortlived, period of official favor with the advent of the Kennedy administration. As Table 1 illustrates, President Kennedy's patronage sparked a dramatic increase in Regular Army Special Forces: from three groups in 1961 when he took office, to seven shortly after his assassination in November 1963. This was also the period of greatest Special Forces strength in the Army Reserve and National Guard components. Kennedy showed his enthusiasm by supporting additional manpower spaces, and by authorizing Special Forces soldiers to wear the green beret, previously banned by the Army high command.<sup>16</sup>

Table 1 -- Special Forces Groups: 1952 to Present

<u>GROUP</u>	<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>ACTIVATION</u>	<u>INACTIVATION</u>
1st	RA	06/24/57 09/01/84	06/30/74 --
2d	AR <sup>a</sup>	03/15/61	01/31/66
3d	RA	12/05/63	12/01/69
4th <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--
5th	RA	09/21/61	--
6th	RA	05/01/63	03/06/71
7th <sup>c</sup>	RA	09/25/53	--
8th	RA	04/01/63	06/30/72
9th	AR <sup>a</sup>	02/01/61	01/31/66
10th	RA	06/11/52	--
11th	AR <sup>a</sup>	03/01/61	--
12th	AR <sup>a</sup>	03/24/61	--
13th	AR <sup>a</sup>	03/01/61	01/21/66
14th <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--
15th <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--
16th	NG <sup>a</sup>	05/01/61	02/10/66
17th	AR <sup>a</sup>	04/03/61	01/31/66
18th <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--
19th	NG <sup>a</sup>	05/01/61	--
20th	NG <sup>a</sup>	05/01/61	--
21st	NG <sup>a</sup>	05/01/61	05/01/63
22d <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--
23d <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--
24th	AR <sup>a</sup>	01/06/61	01/31/66

<sup>a</sup>Allotted to RA 04/15/60; reallocated to AR 12/14/60  
or to NG 05/01/61

<sup>b</sup>Never activated

<sup>c</sup>Redesignation of 77th SFGA

Sources: John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, Army Lineage Series, rev. ed. (Washington, DC, 1972), 892-918; Organizational History Branch, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

Kennedy's patronage heralded a major reorientation of Special Forces from guerrilla warfare sponsorship to counterinsurgency operations. To this was added a civic action or "nation building" mission. Kennedy was seeking "forward initiatives" in foreign policy, a primary theme of his 1960 campaign. He wanted a wider range of "usable military power," particularly to deal with the Soviet policy of supporting "wars of national liberation" in the Third World. Kennedy quickly came to regard the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam

as something of a test of America's ability to counter Communist wars of national liberation. If the Communists

succeeded with such a war in Vietnam, they would be encouraged to stir up insurrectionary wars all through the underdeveloped world; if they could be dealt a costly reversal in Vietnam, the whole idea of insurrectionary war might be dealt a fatal blow.<sup>17</sup>

The Green Berets epitomized Kennedy's commitment to counterinsurgency. They could provide military training, carry out civil action projects and provide inspirational leadership to defenders of threatened nations. An added benefit was derived from the belief that Special Forces troops would eliminate the necessity for large scale commitment of American troops. Kennedy asserted that counterinsurgency required "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."<sup>18</sup> And the soldiers wearing the newly won green beret possessed that training.

The worldwide threat of "wars of national liberation" required a similarly global response. This sparked the Special Action Force (SAF) concept. The SAF was a specially trained, area oriented and particularly language-qualified counterinsurgency team. It was built around a Special Forces group, augmented by attachment of psychological warfare, civil affairs, intelligence, medical, engineering, military police and Army Security Agency (communications security) units. SAF's could be readily deployed either to assist with internal defense planning or to combat an actual insurgency. Eventually five SAF's were formed. Only the 5th (scheduled for Vietnam) and 7th SFGA's, both at Fort Bragg, were not SAF-dedicated.<sup>19</sup>

Although Special Forces troops have served all over the world, they gained their greatest fame in Southeast Asia, particularly during the Vietnam War. The first Green Berets came to Vietnam in 1957, when a team from 1st SFGA trained the nucleus of the South Vietnamese Special Forces (Lac Luong Dac Biet, or LLDB) to sponsor guerrilla activities in North Vietnam. Teams from the 1st, 5th and 7th SFGA's thereafter rotated to Vietnam on temporary duty until the entire 5th SFGA was reassigned from Fort Bragg on October 1, 1964.<sup>20</sup>

The Green Berets' major mission in Vietnam was training and advising paramilitary counter guerrilla units formed from the country's many ethnic and religious minority groups. This began on a small scale among Montagnards of the Central Highlands in late 1961, under CIA auspices, and continued through December 1970, when 5th SFGA prepared to return to Fort Bragg. The original village defender "population denial" program evolved into the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, changing from defense to offensive counter-guerrilla operations in the process. Special Forces advisory efforts (CIDG, Regional Forces and Popular Forces) peaked with over 72,000 native irregulars. With the advent of "Vietnamization" (1968-1971), the CIDG program was closed out, and most CIDG troops became regular soldiers of the Ranger command. Other Special Forces missions included the highly successful "Greek" strategic reconnaissance projects Delta, Sigma and Omega; training LLDB and South Vietnamese Ranger units; operating the MACV long-range reconnaissance patrol school; orienting newly arrived American combat units as the war

expanded after 1965; and staffing the MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG), which trained and assisted agents for sponsoring guerrilla warfare and psychological operations in North Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and South China.<sup>21</sup>

CIDG has been cited as "one of the most successful programs for using civilian forces ever devised by a military force..."<sup>22</sup> Its success is all the more remarkable when seen against the background of deep-seated hostility between the Vietnamese and the minorities; relative ineffectiveness of the LLDB, nominal commanders of the CIDG; and the Saigon government's continued suspicion of Special Forces motives in supporting minority aspirations for political autonomy. Finally, there is a widely held belief that senior American military commanders took advantage of Kennedy's death and the "conventionalization" of the war after 1965 to throttle Special Forces influence. Some point to the sensationalized "Green Beret murder case" as evidence of high command hostility.<sup>23</sup> Col. Robert B. Rheault, one-time commander of 5th SFGA, felt that withdrawal of the group in the first troop reduction increment was indicative of this hostility.

The official explanation, that this was all merely a part of overall troop withdrawal and Vietnamization, certainly failed to stand up under even the most casual scrutiny. On the very face of it, one wonders at the withdrawal of a unit made up of 3,000 highly trained and dedicated volunteers, while conventional units heavily larded with some 300,000 disgruntled draftees remained. One could not help but ask how much headquarters fat remained while good boondock muscle was excised?...And more to the point, why destroy a small, inexpensive, and immensely effective program which provided so much in the area of security and intelligence in the remote areas and among the minority groups?

There is no easy answer, but the decision invited speculation that emotion rather than logic may have governed; that after eighteen years of existence, Special Forces still aroused the old animosities; and worst of all, that after all these years in Vietnam, MACV still did not understand either the CIDG program or revolutionary war.<sup>24</sup>

Speculation about high command hostility aside, there can be no disputing Special Forces' loss of influence after Kennedy's death, so nearly paralleling the demise of OSS when its presidential mentor died.<sup>25</sup> The dismantling of the Special Forces establishment began in 1966, when six National Guard and Army Reserve groups were inactivated. Inactivation of Regular Army units started in December 1969, with 3d SFGA. In March 1971, 5th SFGA returned to Fort Bragg; 6th SFGA was inactivated the same month. Eight SFGA followed in June 1973, and 1st SFGA a year later. By June 1974, Special Forces had been substantially reduced and concentrated in the United States. (Tables 1 and 2)

The widespread unpopularity of policies of intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states prompted an intensive reappraisal of American foreign policy objectives after Vietnam. The Army rapidly reoriented toward confronting an armor-heavy "hot war" in Western Europe. These trends raised a valid question of what role Special Forces might play in a "neo-isolationist" era.<sup>26</sup> While the doctrinal debates were in progress, Special Forces experimented briefly with a "domestic nation building" project from 1971 to 1975. Under this project, Green Berets assisted with 30 communities in seven states with such diverse problems as law enforcement and fire service training, migrant worker housing, and medical and youth delinquency programs. The project was terminated following protestations of unfair competition by private firms, and was attacked as an attempt to "sanitize" an image marred by the Vietnam War.<sup>27</sup>

The Reagan administration has reacted more positively to Special Forces. Conservative political analysts called for cancellation of a Carter administration proposal for deep cuts in remaining Special Forces strength, which at one point envisioned scrapping the entire 7th SFGA. Reagan adopted the conservative recommendation, and has demonstrated a willingness to employ the Green Berets in politically sensitive tasks such as advising the Salvadoran Army. Special Forces has also been suggested as a resource in battling domestic terrorism.<sup>28</sup>

The clearest signs of renewed favor have appeared since late 1982. In October of that year, Army "special warfare" assets were consolidated under the new 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), headquartered at Fort Bragg. Then the Army decided to reactivate 1st SFGA, and even returned the unit's 1st Battalion to Okinawa. Next a third battalion was added to the 75th Infantry (Rangers), along with a regimental headquarters. Discussions continue about possible activation of a second Ranger battalion, this one within the National Guard component. Doubtless these decisions were influenced by the Rangers' excellent performance in the parachute assault which initiated the October 1983 invasion of Grenada. Finally, the Department of Defense has established the Joint Special Operations Agency. This office is directly subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for coordinating special warfare activities of the Army, the Twenty-Third Air Force's special operations squadrons and the expanded Navy SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) structure.<sup>29</sup>

Table 2 -- Army Special Operations Units: 1984

<u>Component</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
RA	1st Special Operations Command (Abn)	Ft. Bragg, NC
	1st SFGA (less 1st Battalion)	Ft. Lewis, WA
	1st Battalion-1st SFGA	Okinawa
	5th SFGA	Ft. Bragg, NC
	7th SFGA (less 3d Battalion)	Ft. Bragg, NC
	3d Battalion-7th SFGA	Ft. Gulick, Panama
	10th SFGA (less 1st Battalion)	Ft. Devens, MA
	1st Battalion-10th SFGA	Bad Tolz, W. Germany
	HQ 75th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders)	Ft. Benning, GA
	1st Battalion (Ranger)-75th Infantry	Hunter AAF, GA
	2d Battalion (Ranger)-75th Infantry	Ft. Lewis, WA
	3d Battalion (Ranger)-75th Infantry	Hunter AAF, GA
	4th Psychological Operations Group	Ft. Bragg, NC
	96th Civil Affairs Battalion	Ft. Bragg, NC
	SF Detachment, Korea	Osan, S. Korea
	Detachment A, Berlin Brigade	West Berlin
AR	11th SFGA	Various Army Areas
	12th SFGA	Various Army Areas
NG	19th SFGA	Various States
	20th SFGA	Various States
	Company G (Ranger), 143d Infantry	Texas ARNG
	Company F (Ranger), 425th Infantry	Michigan ARNG

Sources: Army Times, Sep. 27, 1982 and April 9, 1984; Organizational History Branch, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

### Mountaineer Green Berets

Special Forces units were first allotted to the National Guard component in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1960 force structure program. Some 1,000 officers and men in 80 operational detachments were authorized for five states: West Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina and Utah.<sup>30</sup> West Virginia's two units were authorized effective March 1, 1959. The 101st Special Forces Operational Detachment (SFOD) FC, with six FA teams, was formed by conversion, reorganization and redesignation of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2d Battalion, 150th Armored Cavalry, at Beckley. The 102d SFOD FB, with four FA teams, was formed by consolidation, conversion, reorganization and redesignation of Battery C and the Medical Detachment, 468th Field Artillery Battalion, at Huntington.<sup>31</sup> On October 12, the state's Special Forces allotment was expanded by National Guard Bureau authorization to organize two additional units. The 170th SFOD FD and 166th SF Administrative Detachment AA were new, having no connection with existing units of the West Virginia Army National Guard (WVARNG). The National Guard Bureau also specified the designation of the six FA detachments previously authorized: 165th, 167th-169th and 171st-176th. These changes became effective October 15, 1959.<sup>32</sup>

The designation of Special Forces units may be confusing to persons unfamiliar with military force structure terminology, even those who have studied conventional military units. Special Forces units constituted "a rather unique blend of Army organizational traditions and conventions with the prominent ideas and principles of guerrilla warfare." This was probably inevitable in view of the powerful influence that the OSS operational group concept exerted on the officers who designed the original Special Forces units. A further source of confusion is that "the Special Forces Group itself was not designed to be employed as a tactical entity--as, for instance, a conventional division or brigade--but rather was constructed around a cellular concept in which each area, district and regimental detachment was viewed as a separate and distinct operating unit."<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps the simplest approach to studying Special Forces structure is to refer to the official tables of organization and equipment (TOE) in effect at any given time. A TOE provides a concise method for summarizing an enormous amount of data concerning a military unit. It specifies a unit's official "type designation," internal organization, personnel composition (officers, warrant officers and enlisted men) by rank and occupational specialty, equipment allowance and normally assigned missions. To meet special requirements, a TOE may be officially modified, and is then referred to as an MTOE.

The WVARNG's first Special Forces units were organized under TOE 33-105R, issued April 15, 1955, which prescribed the structure of a group. Six detachment or "team" types were covered: two administrative (AA-Company and AB-Battalion) and four operational (FA-Regiment, FB-District B, FC-District A and FD-Area). The types relevant to WVARNG units are discussed below:

- ° An AA team was commanded by a warrant officer and comprised 12 enlisted men who performed mess, supply, records, armorer

and related "housekeeping" duties at the Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB) in friendly territory, to support deployed operational teams. Each echelon above the FA team was assigned such an administrative team.

- ° The operational teams were structured in a manner to provide ever-broadening capability to support and control guerrilla bands in the theatre of operations:
- The smallest, FA, could build and direct a guerrilla regiment of up to 1,500 men. It comprised a captain, lieutenant (executive officer) and 13 enlisted men highly skilled in intelligence, operations planning, medical care, weaponry, demolitions, and--for the important task of maintaining contact with theatre headquarters--radio operators and repairmen. FA teams were the most prevalent since they constituted the direct intervention elements of a Special Forces group.
- Teams FB-FD contained 24 men each, and were commanded by a major, lieutenant colonel and colonel respectively. The three types of teams mirrored the skills mix of the FA team, with the addition of staff officers in the intelligence, operations, supply and administration functions. As this pyramidal structure suggests, FB-FD teams coordinated, planned for and supported the operations of FA teams in the field with guerrilla bands: the FD team at group headquarters controlled unconventional warfare activities in two or more countries; FC teams controlled the activities of two or more FB teams in a single country; FB teams in turn controlled two or more FA teams within designated areas of a "denied" country.<sup>34</sup>

The state's Special Forces units were reorganized under CARS effective May 1, 1961. All existing units were deleted from the troop allotment and replaced by 16th SFGA, 1st Special Forces, less two companies. (Table 3) Company C, 16th SFGA was simultaneously allotted to the North Carolina ARNG and organized at Wilmington. The newly authorized detachments of West Virginia's Companies A and B were extended federal recognition on July 18 and October 26, 1961, respectively.<sup>35</sup> Federal recognition meant the units had been inspected by a National Guard Bureau representative and found to comply with all applicable regulations.


Table 3 -- Reorganization of WVARNG Special Forces  
Under CARS: May 1, 1961

<u>Old Unit</u>	<u>New Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
170th SFOB (FD)	HHC, 16th SFGA	Charleston
101st SFOD (FC, AA and 6 FA)	Co A, 16th SFGA (less 1 B and 2 A op dets)	Beckley
102d SFOD (FB and 4 FA)	Co B, 16th SFGA (less 1 B and 2 A op dets)	Huntington
(newly authorized)	1 B and 2 A op dets, Co A	Charleston
(newly authorized)	1 B and 2 A op	Parkersburg

Sources: Depts. of the Army and the Air Force,  
National Guard Bureau, Reorganization  
Authority No. 78-61, April 17, 1961

In conjunction with CARS conversions, a new Special Forces group TOE (33-105D) was implemented. In this TOE, Special Forces organization terminology became less esoteric and more attuned to traditional Army organization designations, at least at the higher echelons. (Table 4) The group consisted of an HHC and four Special Forces companies. At full strength, an HHC totaled 262 officers, warrant officers and enlisted men under a colonel. Each company had 250 officers and men (no warrant officers) and was commanded by a lieutenant colonel. A full strength SFGA therefore aggregated 1,262 men. It is interesting to note that the mission statement portion of TOE 33-105D spoke only of guerrilla warfare missions: counterinsurgency was not mentioned at all.<sup>36</sup>

Table 4 — Airborne Special Forces Group (1960)



	OF	WO	EM	TOT
HHC	32	4	226	262
SF Co (4)	200	0	800	1000
SFGA	232	4	1026	1262

Sources: Dept. of the Army TOE 33-105D, March 21, 1960; Dept. of the Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington, DC, Sep. 29, 1961), 18-25.

On March 1, 1962, Company A was transferred from Beckley to Charleston. Simultaneously, the B and two A detachments previously located in the state capital switched to Beckley. The effect of these changes was to concentrate the bulk of 16th SFGA elements in Charleston.<sup>37</sup>

Under a major realignment of National Guard Special Forces effective May 1, 1963, all Company B elements were withdrawn from West Virginia and reallocated to the Maryland ARNG. West Virginia elements were restructured as follows:

Table 5 -- Reorganization of WVARNG  
Special Forces: May 1, 1963

<u>Old Unit</u>	<u>New Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
HHC, 16th SFGA	HHC (with op det augmentation), 16th SFGA	Charleston
Co B, 16th SFGA (less 1 B and 2 A dets) (newly authorized)	Co A, 16th SFGA (less 2 B and 6 A dets)	Huntington
Co A, 16th SFGA (less 1 B and 2 A dets)	1 B and 2 A dets, Co A, 16th SFGA	Clarksburg
1 B and 2 A dets, Co B, 16th SFGA (newly authorized)	1 B and 1 A det, Co A, 16th SFGA	Charleston
1 B and 2 A dets, Co A, 16th SFGA	2 A dets, Co A, 16th SFGA	Parkersburg
	1 A det, Co A, 16th SFGA (federal recognition withdrawn)	Kingwood Beckley


Sources: Depts. of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, Reorganization Authority No. 76-63, April 15, 1963; Lineage and Honors Certificate, 19th SFGA, Organizational History Branch, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

Company A's new Clarksburg and Kingwood detachments were federally recognized on May 7 and September 22, 1963, respectively. The operational detachment augmentation of HHC, 16th SFGA, expanded the group's mission capability. An augmentation detachment was identical in composition to a C detachment, and could be employed to provide a "deputy for operations" to the group commander; serve as liaison to a field army or other tactical command to which the group was attached; establish an alternate SFOB headquarters; or operationally to accomplish other tasks appropriate for a C detachment.<sup>38</sup>

The detachments at Clarksburg and Parkersburg proved shortlived. They and the non-headquarters detachments at Charleston were transferred to Huntington, except for one B and two A detachments relocated to Kingwood, effective November 1, 1964. The operational detachment augmentation of HHC, 16th SFGA, was also deleted on that date.<sup>39</sup>

As part of the nationwide realignment and reduction, 16th SFGA was inactivated under CARS on February 10, 1966. WVARNG Special Forces were reorganized and redesignated under "E" series TOE's as Company F, 19th SFGA, 1st Special Forces.<sup>40</sup>

Table 6 -- Airborne Special Forces Group (1963)



[substructured as  
shown in Table 4]

	<u>OF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOT</u>
HHC	44	4	171	219
SF Co (4)	196	0	780	976
Sig Co	6	2	175	183
Avn Co	22	25	148	195
SFGA	268	31	1274	1573

Source: Dept. of the Army TOE 31-105E,  
Sep. 26, 1963.

Table 7 -- Reorganization of WVARNG  
Special Forces: February 10, 1966

<u>Old Unit</u>	<u>New Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
HHC, 16th SFGA	Co F, 19th SFGA (less 2 B and 8 A dets) (with mobile radio team)	Charleston
Co A, 16th SFGA (less 1 B and 3 A dets)	2 B and 7 A dets, Co F, 19th SFGA	Huntington
1 B and 3 A dets, Co A, 16th SFGA	1 A det, Co F, 19th SFGA	Kingwood


Source: Depts. of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, Reorganization Authority No. 33-66, Feb. 2, 1966; Dept. of the Army TOE 11-247E, Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group, Sept. 23, 1963.

WVARNG Special Forces continued to experience organizational turbulence under 19th SFGA. On July 16, 1967, the Kingwood A detachment was eliminated by consolidation with the Charleston element.

On December 1, 1968, a medical operations section was added to the Charleston element, and an A detachment at Huntington, raising the latter city to two B and eight A detachments. This was part of a nationwide reorganization to bring ARNG Green Beret units from reduced to full structure.<sup>41</sup>

A nationwide restructuring of Guard Special Forces units came September 1, 1972. This was prompted by implementation of the "H" series TOE's, which eliminated the C, B and A detachment designations; upgraded the former companies (C detachments) to three Special Forces battalions and a support battalion; established new Special Forces companies (three per battalion) in lieu of B detachments; and redesignated former A detachments simply as operational detachments. (Table 8) Thus, Company F, 19th SFGA at Charleston was redesignated Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 2d Special Forces Battalion, 19th SFGA, 1st Special Forces. The Huntington element became Company B, 2d Special Forces battalion, 19th SFGA. The HHD was simultaneously augmented with elements normally found only in a support battalion: a forward communications section and medical operations, forward supply and forward support (mess) teams. In addition, the WVARNG was authorized to organize two new units under 2d Special Forces Battalion: Company A at Charleston and Company C at Kingwood. Both new companies were federally recognized September 1, 1972.<sup>42</sup> (Table 9)


Table 8 -- Airborne Special Forces Group (1970)



	OF	WO	EM	TOT
HHC	27	0	52	79
SF Bn (3)	171	0	768	939
SF Supt Bn	30	15	421	466
SFGA	228	15	1241	1484

Source: Dept. of the Army TOE 31-101H,  
June 10, 1970

Table 9 -- WVARNG Special Forces Reorganization (1972)



	OF	WO	EM	TOT
HHD	9	0	22	31
SF Co (3)	48	0	234	282
SF Bn	47	0	256	313
Fwd Commo Sect	0	0	8	8
Med Ops Tm	2	0	3	5
Fwd Supp Tm	0	1	3	4
Fwd Supt Tm (Mess)	0	0	9	9

Sources: Depts. of the Army and Air Force,  
National Guard Bureau, Reorganization  
Authority No. 179-72, Aug. 30, 1972.

The Special Forces battalion has two primary functions: to provide staff elements to expand the capability of the SFOB and/or control a designated unconventional warfare operations area (UWOA); and to provide operational detachments to conduct unconventional warfare, special operations and foreign internal defense missions.<sup>43</sup> The structure shown in Table 9 is more fully explained below:

- ° The battalion HHD is the principal planning and staff element. It plans, controls and directs the activities of assigned and attached units, operates forward operational bases, commands designated UWOA's, provides liaison parties to corps and higher headquarters in the theatre of operations and provides augmentation to the SFGA staff sections. The HHD--which has carried the secondary official designation "C detachment" since September 1974--is divided into two units:

- battalion headquarters, consisting of a battalion commander (lieutenant colonel) and administrative (S-1), intelligence (S-2), operations (S-3), logistics (S-4), civil affairs/psychological operations (S-5) and other staff officers. Total strength is nine officers and three enlisted men.
- headquarters section, consisting of 14 enlisted men performing operations, supply, medical, personnel and communications functions.<sup>44</sup>
  - ° The three line companies are responsible for conducting and supporting unconventional warfare operations, stability operations and "direct action missions which are peculiar to Special Forces due to their organization, training, equipment and psychological preparation." The companies are divided into two types of units:
    - company headquarters (B detachment), which commands and controls assigned operational detachments, prepares the detachments for operations, operates a forward operational base, serves as a "pilot team to assess the resistance potential" in and exercise control of a UWOA, and "serves as a basic building block for a force designated to conduct special operations." The B detachment is commanded by a major with a captain as executive officer (second-in-command). There are also four enlisted men: sergeant major, tactical communications chief, nuclear-biological-chemical operations noncommissioned officer (NCO) and radio operator.
    - six operational detachments (A detachments) responsible for organizing, equipping, training and advising indigenous forces in unconventional warfare; conducting special operations; training, advising and assisting United States and allied forces or agencies in the conduct of foreign internal defense; training, advising and assisting non-US military or paramilitary forces, to include operational, logistical and fiscal support; infiltrating and exfiltrating specified areas by air, land or sea; surviving and operating in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods with minimal external direction and support; advising, assisting and training counterpart indigenous forces; serving as a liaison party; and augmenting the staff sections of a battalion or SFGA in operational planning. All six A detachments are organizationally identical, with a captain commanding and a lieutenant as executive officer over ten enlisted men: operations sergeant, assistant operations sergeant, heavy weapons leader, light weapons leader, medical NCO, assistant medical NCO, tactical communications chief, radio operator, Special Forces engineer sergeant and Special Forces engineer. Although organizationally identical, two of the A detachments carry special designations. Personnel of the A detachment-SCUBA and A detachment-MFF (military free fall) are especially qualified in those methods of covert infiltration.<sup>45</sup>

Organizational turbulence has continued during the last decade. Company A moved from Charleston to Beckley on January 1, 1976; HHD, 2d Special Forces Battalion transferred from Charleston to Ceredo (near Huntington) on October 1, 1978. And Company A's tenure at Beckley lasted just over three years, its federal recognition being withdrawn February 28, 1979.<sup>46</sup> These shifts concentrated West Virginia Green Beret units in Ceredo, as shown in the following table.

Table 10 -- WVARNG Special Forces: 1983

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
HHD, 2d SF Bn, 19th SFGA	Huntington (Ceredo)
Co B, 2d SF Bn, 19th SFGA	Huntington (Ceredo)
Co C, 2d SF Bn, 19th SFGA	Kingwood (Camp Dawson)

Source: Depts. of the Army and the Air Force,  
National Guard Bureau, Reorganization  
Authority No. 40-79, Feb. 28, 1979.

In 1959, less than ten percent of the original WVARNG cadre was Special Forces or even airborne (parachute) qualified. Hence there was a heavy emphasis on these skills, as well as foreign language training, in annual training at Forts Bragg and Benning. The 16th SFGA also used committee training and six additional weekend assemblies per year to help qualify its operational detachments. By 1962, West Virginia Green Berets were being cited as "highly respected" by their counterparts in the 7th SFGA, with which the 16th shared a close association. In September of that year, state elements of the 16th SFGA participated in Exercise HIGH POINT, a guerrilla warfare maneuver sponsored by the 19th SFGA in West Germany. Indeed, since their formation, West Virginia Special Forces units have participated in annual training under both Guard and Regular Army cognizance, in localities ranging from Alaska to South Korea and from Germany to the Caribbean islands. In common with all Special Forces groups, the 16th and 19th had specific geographical areas of planned employment. Although the 19th's designated area is classified, it has changed since 1959.<sup>47</sup>

Camp Dawson, the state's only permanent military reservation, has been run by the Green Berets since 1963. It is a major training center for Special Forces and other units in the eastern United States. Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, and North Carolina Guard and Reserve groups have trained there, along with Regular Army groups and Marine Corps units. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the site is that foreign elite units, notably Britain's SAS and the Canadian Airborne Regiment, are no strangers to Camp Dawson. Annually since 1978, state Green Berets have sponsored the Sgt. Maj. Harold C. Pierce Memorial Jump Fest, a precision parachute jumping contest. Pierce was one of the first state soldiers to become Special Forces and airborne qualified, and was a promoter of both until his death in 1977.<sup>48</sup>

Today's Mountaineer Green Berets are concentrating on guerrilla warfare operations, with secondary training emphasis on direct action missions. The rate of full Special Forces qualification is "substantial" but classified. Some sixty percent of unit members are prior service veterans of the combat arms (infantry, armor and artillery). About twenty percent have had active duty Special Forces experience as engineer or weapons specialists in either the 5th or 7th groups. Officers come from a more varied background, having served in the 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th and other groups. Training still includes six more unit assemblies per year than required of non-Special Forces Guard units. These extra assemblies are authorized so that troopers, who are on jump status, can maintain airborne proficiency. Taken together with overnight field training exercises and training in a non-pay status, it is conservatively estimated that the average Special Forces trooper spends "approximately 80-100 hours more annually in training...than does his non-SF counterpart..."<sup>49</sup>

Trooper motivation is evident in both the extra training hours and in the fact that WVARNG Special Forces have "an appreciably higher retention rate than other units once a unit member becomes airborne and SF qualified." Soldiers who complete the qualification training "are more motivated and have a greater sense of pride in their accomplishments than do soldiers of other types of units. Consequently, we keep them longer."<sup>50</sup> High retention is of course a feature valued in any military unit, but particularly in Special Forces. Guard and Reserve Green Beret groups currently constitute over 50 percent of Special Forces strength, and are a critical component of the Army's total special warfare capability. Many of these units have members with "more experience and training than the active-duty groups, and some detachments filled with ex-Vietnam SF veterans are more combat-ready than those at [Forts] Bragg and Devens."<sup>51</sup>

It appears that the state's Green Berets must continue to maintain their readiness in the face of even more organizational turbulence. At latest word, the 2d Special Forces Battalion, 19th SFGA may be relocated to Parkersburg (Wood County Airport) in late Fiscal Year 1985 or early Fiscal Year 1986. This change is being contemplated in order to accommodate the relocation of a Guard aviation unit to the battalion's current facilities at Tri-State Airport.<sup>52</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Henri Michel, The Shadow War: European Resistance, 1939-1945, trans. Richard Barry (New York, 1972), 50-132; Otto Heilbrunn, Warfare in the Enemy's Rear (New York, 1963), 97-101; Col. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a 'Special Warfare' Capability for the United States Army" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1979), 40-55; Col. (Ret.) Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years (Nevato, CA, 1983), 11.

<sup>2</sup>Paddock, 39, 43-6; Heilbrunn, 97, 102-3; R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkley, CA, 1972), 179.

<sup>3</sup>Heilbrunn, 95-6; Michel, 215; Smith, 28-9, 179; Paddock, 44-6; Simpson, 12.

<sup>4</sup>Paddock, 48-9, 55-6, 60.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 62-6.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 108-27.

<sup>7</sup>Paddock, 158-62, 170-2; Simpson, 14-7.

<sup>8</sup>Paddock, 186-221; Simpson, 16, 24.

<sup>9</sup>Paddock, 241; John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, Army Lineage Series, rev. ed. (Washington, DC, 1972), 908.

<sup>10</sup>Paddock, 4-5, 189, 244, 250-1; Simpson, 35-52. As late as 1961, the basic Special Forces doctrine manual contained only one paragraph, in over 250 pages of text, concerning counter-guerrilla operations. Dept. of the Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington, DC, Sept. 29, 1961), 166, cited hereafter as FM 31-21.

<sup>11</sup>Mahon and Danysh, 892, 902; Paddock, 169; John G. Hubbell, "The Army's Deadliest Soldiers," Reader's Digest 71 (July 1957), 129-34; Col. R. W. Van de Velde, "The Neglected Deterrent," Military Review 38 (Aug. 1958), 3-10.

<sup>12</sup>Van de Velde, 5; Heilbrunn, 104-5.

<sup>13</sup>Mahon and Danysh, 88-102; Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor, Armor-Cavalry, Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC, 1969), 80-3; Monte Bourjaily, Jr., "The Question of CARS," Army 11 (July 1961), 23-7.

<sup>14</sup>The 1st Special Service Force was activated July 9, 1942, at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana, to conduct cross-snow raiding operations against industrial facilities in occupied Norway. When that project was canceled, the Force became a general purpose raiding unit. Force members were trained in parachute, amphibious and mountain operations. They fought in the Aleutians, the Mediterranean and Southern France, where the Force was disbanded January 6, 1945. Aside from its missions, the Force was unique in being binational. Canadian and American troops served together and were returned to their respective national commands when the Force was disbanded. The 1st Ranger Battalion was activated June 19, 1942, at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, and commanded by Maj. William O. Darby. The battalion was trained by British Commando instructors, and an element participated in the famous Dieppe raid. The battalion then spearheaded the North African invasion. In July 1943, Darby raised two new battalions (3d and 4th), which joined the 1st Battalion to form Ranger Force. All battalions were officially redesignated "Ranger Infantry" in August 1943. After seeing heavy action in the invasions of Sicily, Salerno and Anzio, Ranger Force was annihilated while leading a breakout attempt from Anzio at the end of January 1944. Ranger Force was broken up, with some Rangers going to 1st Special Service Force and the rest returning to America to train other troops. The 2d Ranger Infantry Battalion served with distinction in France and Germany, and the 6th Battalion was the only Ranger unit to serve in the Pacific. The 6th was also the last Ranger unit inactivated (December 30, 1945). Ranger units enjoyed a brief resurgence during the Korean War, when six companies actually fought in Korea. But the Rangers were mostly used as line infantry rather than raiders, and the last company was inactivated in December 1951. Paddock, 35-7, 58, 188; Simpson, 11-3; Mahon and Danysh, 85, 887-90; Heilbrunn, 53; Lt. Col. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force: A War History of the North Americans, 1942-1944 (Washington, DC, 1947); Col. Stanley W. Dziuban, Special Studies: Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC, 1959), 258-68; Dept. of the Army Field Manual 21-50, Ranger Training and Ranger Operations (Washington, DC, Jan. 23, 1962) with Change 1 (Nov. 20, 1969), 328-33.

<sup>15</sup>Mahon and Danysh, 98, 110, 887-90; Memorandum, Office of the Adjutant General, HQ, Dept. of the Army, AGAO-O (M) 322 (14 Apr 60), subject: Change in Status of Units, dated April 14, 1960, in file "20th Special Forces Group," Organizational History Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC (cited hereafter as OHB-USACMH).

<sup>16</sup>Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, MacMillan Wars of the United States Series (New York, 1973), 456; Joe Wagner, "Army Special Forces: Step Child or Child Prodigy?," Armed Forces Management 12 (May 1966), 56; Col. John W. Frye, "The Green Beret: Where It Began," Army 26 (May 1976), 39-41; Simpson 30-3. A copy of the original message from Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel to Commanding General, Continental Army Command (DA 574088, Sept. 23, 1961), is in file "Green Beret for 1st Special Forces," OHB-USACHMH.

<sup>17</sup>Lt. Col. John R. Galvin, "Special Forces at the Crossroads," Army 23 (Dec. 1973), 22-3; Weigley, 445, 450. The quote is from Weigley, 460. For a discussion of Kennedy as impetus for the American counterinsurgency movement, see Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York, 1977), 18, 52-88.

<sup>18</sup>Quoted in Weigley, 456-7. The sudden popularity of counterinsurgency is evident in a flood of articles in such periodicals as Army and Military Review after 1961. Of particular interest is the article "Guerrilla Warfare" in Military Review 42 (May 1962), 73-82, which presents an annotated listing of 48 "special warfare" articles published in the Review between 1956 and 1962. Also in 1962, the Army's Office of the Chief of Information released Special Warfare, U.S. Army: An Army Specialty, a glossy 142-page publication covering history and theory of special warfare, and the missions of Special Forces, psychological operations and civil affairs units. Special Warfare can be interpreted as an Army attempt to maintain a dominant role against newly emergent units such as the Navy SEAL teams and the Air Commandos. Although the Marine Corps did not activate special warfare units, it gave considerable publicity to its history of counter guerrilla successes in such campaigns as Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Every service wanted a share of the wealth of resources suddenly being made available to pursue counterinsurgency. See Blaufarb, 75, 76-7; Allan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, MacMillan Wars of the United States (New York, 1980), 548-9. The "conventional" Army's doctrine on the subject, Field Manual 31-16, Counter guerrilla Operations was published Feb. 19, 1963. Interestingly, it spoke only of infantry and airborne infantry brigade operations, and mentioned Special Forces only by citing FM 31-21 (see note 10 above) in the references appendix.

<sup>19</sup>Wagner, 56, 59; Simpson, 69-70; Dept. of the Army Field Manual 31-1, Psychological Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine (Washington, DC, 1971), page 2-1. A spectacular example of SAF effectiveness was the training of Bolivian Army Ranger units by a team from 8th SFGA. The Rangers subsequently tracked down and killed guerrilla warfare exponent Che Guevara on Oct. 8, 1967. Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (New York, 1971) 450-1, 472-81, 488-9; Simpson 84-5. SAF's were redesignated Security Assistance Forces in the spring of 1972. William Gardner Bell and Karl E. Cocke (comp. and ed.), Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington, DC, 1977), 18.

<sup>20</sup>Col. Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies Series (Washington, DC, 1973), 4-5, 30, 74; Simpson, 87. Kelly's and Simpson's works are the most comprehensive studies of Special Forces operations in Vietnam published to date.

<sup>21</sup>Kelly; Simpson, 95-136, 143-52, 165-77, 199-215; Col. Robert [B.] Rheault, "The Special Forces and the CIDG Program," in W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell (eds.), The Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1977), 246-55; Brig. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, Vietnam Studies Series (Washington, DC, 1975), 17, 20, 33-5, 38-41, 53-5, 74-5, 91; Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence, 1965-1967, Vietnam Studies

Series (Washington, DC, 1974), 105, 107-9, 156; Blaufarb, 106-7, 258-60; Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC, 1981), 239-45, 251-3. Another interesting but little known Special Forces activity was research on tropical diseases by the Field Epidemiological Survey Team from 1966 to 1968. Maj. Gen. Spurgeon [H.] Neel, [Jr.], Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965-1970, Vietnam Studies Series (Washington, DC, 1973), 131.

<sup>22</sup>Kelly, 7. See also Reheault, 253, 255, and Simpson, 214.

<sup>23</sup>"From Legend to Liability," Newsweek 76 (Aug. 24, 1970), 26; Kelly, 147-8; Simpson, 164-77; Wagner, 54-5; Blaufarb, 80-2, 118-9, 207, 250-5, 260-1, 268-9, 286-7.

<sup>24</sup>Reheault, 245. This interpretation is disputed by Simpson, who states (200, 202) that early withdrawal of 5th SFGA had actually been planned by the Special Forces themselves as early as 1967.

<sup>25</sup>Paddock, 53; Simpson, 11.

<sup>26</sup>Blaufarb, 288, 299-301; Simpson, 217-8; Galvin, 21-4; Capt. Shaun M. Darragh, "Rangers and Special Forces: 'Two Edges of the Same Dagger,'" Army 27 (Dec. 1977), 14-9; Maj. David C. Schlachter and Maj. Fred J. Stubbs, "Special Operations Forces: Not Applicable?," Military Review 58 (Feb. 1978), 15-26.

<sup>27</sup>"Nation-Mending at Home," Time 97 (June 21, 1971), 20; "Green Berets: Peace Specialists Now," U.S. News and World Report 73 (Nov. 6, 1972), 46; "Green Berets: Back to Guns," U.S. News and World Report 78 (Feb. 17, 1975), 64; William L. Robb, "Army Snow Job," New Republic 165 (Dec. 11, 1971), 15-7.

<sup>28</sup>Tidal W. McCoy and Sven Kraemer, "The Department of Defense," in Charles L. Heatherly (ed.), Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration (Washington, DC, 1981), 107; Army Times, Sept. 18, 1978, March 24, 1980 and Aug. 18, 1980; "Low Profile: Green Berets Defend Their Role," Time 117 (May 4, 1981), 41; "Next Stop - Central America?" U.S. News and World Report 95 (July 11, 1983), 20-4; Maj. Gen. William R. Farrell, "Military Involvement in Domestic Terror Incidents," Naval War College Review 34 (July-Aug. 1981), 61-3; file, "1st Special Forces Operational Detachment D," OHB-USACMH; Theodore Shackley, The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations (New York, 1981).

<sup>29</sup>Army Times, Sept. 27, 1982; Simpson, 228; Public Affairs Office, 1st Special Operations Command (Abn), June 16, 1983; Romana Danysh, OHB-USACMH, July 11, 1984; Washington Post, June 10, 1984; Col. David J. Baratto, "Special Forces in the 1980s: A Strategic Reorientation," Military Review 63 (March 1983), 2-14.

<sup>30</sup>Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year 1960 (Washington, DC, 1960), 33-4, and Fiscal Year 1961, 40-1, cited hereafter by fiscal year as NCB Annual Report. Thirty-five operational detachments were also allotted to the Army Reserve in 1959. W. D. McGlasson, "Have Guts, Will Travel," National Guardsman 14 (April 1960), 2-3, 31.

<sup>31</sup>Depts. of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau (NGB) Reorganization Authority (RA) No. 9-59, Feb. 6, 1959, in file "19th Special Forces Group," OHB-USACHMH (cited hereafter as NGB RA No.).

<sup>32</sup>NGB RA No. 163-59, Oct. 12, 1959.

<sup>33</sup>Paddock, 244-5.

<sup>34</sup>Simpson, 36; Dept. of the Army TOE 33-51OR, Special Forces Organization, Special Forces Group, Airborne, April 25, 1955, with Changes 1 and 2. (For ease of reference, TOE's will hereafter be cited by number and date only; changes will be indicated "C 1," "C 2," etc.). See also McGlasson, 3.

<sup>35</sup>NGB RA No. 142-61, Aug. 4, 1961; NGB RA No. 269-61, Nov. 21, 1961; Lineage and Honors Certificate, 16th SFGA, OHB-USACHMH (cited hereafter as Lineage and Honors); NGB Annual Report, FY 1961, 40-1.

<sup>36</sup>TOE 33-105D, March 21, 1960, with C 1 and C 2.

<sup>37</sup>NGB RA No. 7-62, Jan. 16, 1962.

<sup>38</sup>NGB RA No. 136-63, June 13, 1963; NGB RA No. 200-63, Oct. 16, 1963; FM 21-31, 22, 28; NGB Annual Report, FY 1963, 38. The 21st SFGA was inactivated as part of this realignment (see Table 1 of text).

<sup>39</sup>NGB RA No. 327-64, Oct. 30, 1964.

<sup>40</sup>Components of the 19th SFGA were distributed over six other states: HHC, Company A and Company G, Utah; Company B, Maryland; Company C, Montana; Company D, Rhode Island; Company E, New York; and, effective Jan. 31, 1968, Company H, Colorado (Lineage and Honors, 19th SFGA). See NGB Annual Report, FY 1966, 34-5, for realignment and map of ARNC SF distribution.

<sup>41</sup>NGB RA No. 38-67, May 22, 1967; NGB RA No. 164-68, Nov. 6, 1968; Dept. of the Army TOE 31-106E, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group, Sept. 24, 1963, with C 8; NGB Annual Report, FY 1969, 31.

<sup>42</sup>NGB RA No. 179-72, Aug. 30, 1972, with C 1 and C 2: NGB RA No. 218-72, Sept. 27, 1972; File "SF Reorganization 1970's," OHB-USACMH; Dept. of the Army TOE 11-247H, Signal Company, Special Forces Support Battalion, Airborne Special Forces Group, June 10, 1970; Dept. of the Army TOE 31-126H, Headquarters and Service Company, Special Forces Support Battalion, Airborne Special Forces Group, June 10, 1970. Implementation of the "H" series TOE's resulted in a net increase of 25 ARNG Special Forces units (NGB Annual Report, FY 1973, 30).

<sup>43</sup>Dept. of the Army TOE 31-105H000, Special Forces Battalion (Airborne), Airborne Special Forces Group, June 10, 1970, with C 4.

<sup>44</sup>Dept. of the Army TOE 31-106H000, Headquarters, Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) (C Detachment), Airborne Special Forces Group, June 10, 1970, with C 25.

<sup>45</sup>Dept. of the Army TOE 31-107H000, Special Forces Company, Airborne Special Forces Group, June 10, 1970, with C 17; Public Affairs Ofc, 1st Spec Opns Cmd (Abn) (Prov), June 16, 1983.

<sup>46</sup>NGB RA No. 6-76, Dec. 12, 1975; NGB RA No. 282-78, Oct. 25, 1978; NGB RA No. 40-79, Feb. 28, 1979; NGB Annual Report, FY 1979, 33. Company A, 2d SF Battalion, 19th SFGA was reallocated to the Rhode Island ARNG March 1, 1979, to replace the former Company C, 5th SF Battalion, 20th SFGA, deactivated (NGB RA No. 35-79, March 1, 1979).

The following table is based on information provided by the Reserve Advisor's Office JFK Special Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, on June 16, 1983, and OHB-USACMH on June 20, 1983 (the latter referencing NGB RA No. 41-79, March 1, 1979, with C 1, March 11, 1981). All units listed below are ARNG.

#### 19th SFGA

HHC, 19th SFGA	Salt Lake City, UT
HHD, 1st SF Bn	Camp Williams, UT
Co A, 1st SF Bn	Layton, UT
Co B, 1st SF Bn	Provo, UT
Co C, 1st SF Bn	Salt Lake City, UT
HHD, 2d SF Bn	Ceredo, WV
Co A, 2d SF Bn	East Greenwich, RI
Co B, 2d SF Bn	Ceredo, WV
Co C, 2d SF Bn	Kingwood, WV

#### 20th SFGA

HHC, 20th SFGA	Birmingham, AL
HHD, 1st SF Bn	Huntsville, AL
Co A, 1st SF Bn	Decatur, AL
Co B, 1st SF Bn	Mobile, AL
Co C, 1st SF Bn	Glen Arm, MD

20th SFGA (continued)

HHD, 2d SF Bn  
Co A, 2d SF Bn  
Co B, 2d SF Bn  
Co C, 2d SF Bn  
HHD, 3d SF Bn  
Co A, 3d SF Bn  
Co B, 3d SF Bn  
Co C, 3d SF Bn

Jackson, MS  
Camp Shelby, MS  
Glen Arm, MD  
Columbus, MS  
Coral Gables, FL  
Camp Blanding, FL  
Tampa, FL  
Ft. Lauderdale, FL

Since 1970, SF group TOE 31-101H00 has undergone three major revisions. The first deleted the support battalion and replaced it with separate signal and service companies, reducing overall group strength to 1,226. The second change added a combat intelligence company (combat electronic warfare and intelligence, or CEWI) and raised group strength to 1,347. The final change redesignated the latter as a military intelligence company (CEWI) and increased group strength to 1,380.

<sup>47</sup>NGB Annual Report, FY 1960, 33-4, FY 1961, 40-1, FY 1962, 48-51, FY 1963, 38, and FY 1964, 40-1; information provided to the author by Capt. Dennis V. Garrison, Jr., S-1, 2d SF Bn, 19th SFGA, in June 1983 (cited hereafter as Garrison to author, June 1983); "History of Special Forces in West Virginia Army National Guard," n.p., n.d. [Charleston, 1972?], 2 (typescript document provided by Capt. Garrison), cited hereafter as "History of SF."

<sup>48</sup>NGB Annual Report, FY 1962, 51, FY 1964, 40-1, FY 1965, 33 and FY 1966, 35; "History of SF," 3; Pamela A. Kane, "An Exchange of Wings Over West Virginia," National Guard 34 (Nov. 1980), 15-7.

<sup>49</sup>Garrison to author, June 1983.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Simpson, 219-21, 223, 226; Dr. Roy A. Werner, "US Reserves and National Guard," in Ray Bonds (ed.), The US War Machine: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of American Military Equipment and Strategy (New York, 1978), 248, Table 6.

<sup>52</sup>Garrison to author, Sept. 13, 1983.

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